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Abstract
Financial markets are increasingly fragmented. How to supply liquidity in this envi-
ronment? Using an inventory model, we analyze how two strategic intermediaries compete
across two venues that can be hit simultaneously by liquidity shocks of equal or opposite
signs. Although order flow is fragmented ex-ante, we show that intermediaries might
strategically consolidate it ex-post, improving global liquidity. We also find that local
spreads co-move together across venues as a result of global inventory management. Us-
ing Euronext proprietary data, we uncover new evidence of inventory control across venues
and find that local spreads vary in a way uniquely predicted by the model.
Keywords: Market fragmentation, multi-venue market-making, bid-ask spreads
JEL Classification code: G10, G12, G20
A“market making strategy” is defined as a “strategy involving posting firm, simultaneous
two-way quotes [...] on a single trading venue or across different trading venues, with
the result of providing liquidity on a regular and frequent basis to the overall market”.
Directive 2014/65/UE, MiFID II, May 15, 2014
1 Introduction
In the last decade, advances in technology and changes in regulation both in the U.S.
(RegNMS) and in Europe (MiFID) have fostered the proliferation of alternative trading
venues. As a result, it has become much easier for intermediaries to engage in market-
making simultaneously across more than one trading venue. For instance, KCG Holdings
Inc., one of the largest U.S. trading firms, trades NYSE-listed securities in a broad set
of trading platforms which include ARCA, GETMATCHED, BATS-Z, NYSE, EDGA,
NASDAQ, BATS-Y, BX, or LIGHTPOOL. Recent empirical evidence (e.g., Brogaard et
al, 2014; Jovanovic and Menkveld, 2015; Menkveld, 2013; van Kervel, 2014) shows that
high frequency traders, namely financial institutions which have invested in high speed
trading capacity, informally undertake this multi-venue market-making role.
In this paper, we develop a market-making model to analyze how risk-averse intermedi-
aries strategically supply liquidity across multiple trading venues. We test the predictions
of our model using a proprietary dataset from Euronext on multi-traded stocks, in which
we can uniquely identify financial institutions involved in multi-venue market-making
strategies and compute their inventory across venues.
Intuitively, when there exists a single market and a market-maker is in a long position,
she revises quotes downward to increase the chances to shed some of her risky position. In
a fragmented environment, the size of this downward price revision should however take
into account what may happen in other venues. Her quoting aggressiveness within one
venue should reflect her willingness to absorb liquidity shocks at other venues, as well as
the degree of competition in those venues.
We develop this intuition using an inventory model based on Ho and Stoll (1983), in
which two risk averse market-makers compete to simultaneously post prices in two venues
that are exogenously hit by buy or sell liquidity shocks. We introduce an asymmetry by
assuming that the venue termed as the dominant market receives a larger shock than the
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alternative venue termed as the satellite market. Liquidity shocks might be of the same
signs or of opposite signs. We call the sum of liquidity shocks across venues the global
order flow.
When liquidity shocks have the same sign across venues, an intermediary faces a “dual
liability risk”: in case her quotes are simultaneously hit, the market-maker executes, say,
a cumulated buy transaction. One might expect that the premium due to this additional
risk leads to larger spreads, but this is not always the case. The market-maker is willing
to consolidate the global order flow when her inventory is very large since it allows her
to better lay off her risky inventory. She faces, however, the competition of the opponent
that might choose to compete in a single venue and not in both of them. This forces the
market-maker to set very aggressive quotes across venues to be sure to execute the global
order flow. In this case, ex ante fragmentation (the existence of two venues) increases
within-venue competition and leads to ex post consolidation of the global order flow. In
contrast, when the market-maker’s inventory is lower, she chooses to execute only the
shock that best mean-revert her risky inventory. She thus refrains from competing in
the other venue. The global order flow remains ex post fragmented, since shocks do not
interact and are absorbed by different intermediaries.
When liquidity shocks across venues have opposite signs, the impact of a cumulated
transaction across venues is smaller due to an “offsetting” effect. This might not be
desirable for risk-averse intermediaries. For instance, when a market-maker’s inventory
position is very long, she is reluctant to absorb a sell shock that would exacerbate her
risky inventory exposure. She will thus post attractive prices only in the venue hit by a
buy shock to reduce her inventory risk. In this case, the global order flow remains ex post
fragmented and competition is very weak in the venue hit by the sell shock. When her
inventory is low, the market-maker is willing to execute shocks that offset each other to
keep her inventory low. She thus posts competitive prices to attract the entire order flow,
again leading to ex post consolidation.
The model shows that market-makers post prices within one venue that depend on
the sign and the magnitude of the shock in the other venue. The interdependence of
quoting aggressiveness across venues in turn impacts the tightness of spreads in each venue.
Interestingly, ex ante, this impact may be positive or negative. Local liquidity, measured
here by expected spreads, only worsens in some cases: namely when the probability to
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observe shocks with the same sign is high. Global liquidity, measured by ex ante total
transaction costs, may also be better or worse, depending on the magnitude of the shock
hitting the dominant venue and on the probability that shocks have the same sign across
venues. The existence of strategic multi-venue intermediaries makes liquidity, measured
by spreads, interconnected across venues. Our paper thus proposes a new explanation -
multi-venue inventory management - for the commonality of liquidity across venues.
Our results still hold if we relax some of the model’s assumptions. First, we analyze
the case of a global liquidity demander that optimally splits his liquidity demand across
venues. We show that, even if the liquidity demand is endogenized, the market remains
ex ante fragmented. Second, we investigate whether intermediaries would prefer trading
together to share risks in a pre-trading stage. We find that, in some cases, multi-venue
intermediaries prefer not to trade in the inter-dealer market but trade directly in the
customer-dealer marker.
To test the model, we adopt a two-step empirical approach. In the first step, we
investigate whether inventory effects across venues are present in our data, a test that, to
the best of our knowledge, has never been performed. This step is meant to empirically
validate our assumption that intermediaries manage risk by controlling inventory across
venues. In the second step, we test the main prediction of our model, i.e., that bid-
ask spreads within one venue vary with the way the global order flow fragments across
venues and with the divergence in intermediaries’ inventories. In particular, spreads
should decrease when shocks have the same signs across venues and when divergence is
high. This result is uniquely predicted by our model and it is the opposite of what an
adverse-selection-based model would predict.
Our analysis uses a proprietary dataset on multi-venue traded stocks from Euronext
on a four-month period in 2007. When Euronext was created in 2000 as a result of the
merger of several European Stock Exchanges, the stocks which used to be multi-listed in
different Exchanges fell into the Euronext jurisdiction. Within Euronext, trading rules
in all markets were harmonized and structured based on the Paris Bourse limit order
book model. Order books remained separate with price-time priority enforced within
each market, but not across markets. Moreover, during that period (that is, before the
implementation of MiFID in November 2007), Euronext collected the overwhelming ma-
jority of the trades. This environment therefore provides an excellent laboratory to test
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our predictions.
In our dataset, orders and trades sent to or executed in any limit order book are flagged
with a unique identifier and the account used by the financial institution. This enables us
to identify 46 multi-venue intermediaries, that is, members acting either as proprietary
traders or as exchange-regulated market-makers, who post order messages (submission,
revision, or cancellation) and trade at least once in each of the two exchanges on which
the stock is traded. Due to the supremacy of Euronext during the sample period, our
reconstitution of intermediaries’ net positions is a good proxy for their aggregate inventory.
Figure 1 illustrates our data. The top graph shows the multi-venue quoting activity of a
Euronext intermediary trading the French gaz utility Suez both on Euronext Paris and
Euronext Brussels on January 19, 2007. The bottom graph shows the aggregate inventory.
Interestingly this inventory tends to mean-revert over the day. Her quoting aggressiveness
also varies across hours and across venues (quotes of the satellite venue are more distant
from the midpoint of the consolidated book).
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
In accordance with Figure 1, our empirical analysis finds evidence of inventory ef-
fects. Using a logit model, we find that multi-venue intermediaries, in particular formally
registered market-makers, are more likely to submit messages aiming at mean-reverting
inventory in a venue when their preexisting orders have been passively hit in the other
venue. This result validates our hypothesis that aggregate inventory is a driver of multi-
venue market-making strategies. It also makes this paper one of the first to uncover
evidence on cross-venue inventory effects. More importantly, our empirical analysis shows
that bid-ask spreads within one venue are significantly lower when our measure of diver-
gence in inventories is high and when liquidity shocks across venues have the same sign,
in line with our main prediction.
Our paper contributes to the theoretical literature on multi-market trading. Tradi-
tional models including Pagano (1989), Chowdhry and Nanda (1991), Bernhardt and
Hughson (1997), Easley et al (1996), and Foucault and Menkveld (2008) assume that
quotes are competitively set by independent pools of market makers in multiple markets
to satisfy the zero-profit condition. They focus on the routing or order splitting decisions
of strategic liquidity demanders, who can either be informed or not. We instead exoge-
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nously fix order flows routed towards each market to focus on the inter-dependent quoting
strategies of multi-venue market-makers. As Seppi (1997) and Parlour and Seppi (2003),
we model competition for order flow based on liquidity provision when market-makers are
not perfectly competitive.
We also contribute to the empirical literature on how traders operate in multi-market
environments. Menkveld (2008) and Halling, Moulton, and Panayide`s (2013) focus on
how liquidity demanders adjust their trading strategies to multi-trading. In contrast, we
investigate how liquidity suppliers strategically trade in a multi-venue environment. Our
empirical analysis is most closely related to van Kervel (2014) and Jovanovic and Menkveld
(2015). van Kervel (2014) finds that trades on the most active venues for 10 FTSE100
stocks are often followed by immediate cancellations of limit orders on competing venues,
which would be expected in the presence of multi-venue market-makers that strategically
balance their aggregate inventory. Jovanovic and Menkveld (2015) statistically identify a
multi-venue intermediary actively trading across Euronext and Chi-X, and find that the
participation of this intermediary has an impact on spreads and volumes. Our model of
strategic competition across venues also corroborates their findings. Since each institution
in our sample is identified by a unique identifier across the multiple limit order books we
are able to precisely compute the aggregate inventory and analyze the related quoting
strategies of intermediaries who exploit the multi-market environment. Our results thus
extend and complement the existing empirical findings.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and investigates
the price formation in a two-venue market-making environment. Section 3 describes the
data, provides summary statistics and tests the main implications of the model. Section
4 concludes the paper. All proofs are available in the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 The basic setting
We consider the market for a risky asset with a random final cash flow v˜ which is nor-
mally distributed with expected value µ and variance σ2. There are two types of market
participants: investors who demand liquidity and intermediaries who supply liquidity.
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A fragmented market. We suppose that the risky security trades in two trading venues,
denoted D and S, that we assume to be visible. The venues can be exogenously hit by
buy or sell shocks. By convention, a buy (resp. sell) shock generates a buy (resp. sell)
liquidity demand denoted Q > 0 (resp. Q < 0). We call the sum of the liquidity demands
the “global” order flow.1 We assume that the liquidity demand sent to venue D, denoted
QD, is larger than that routed to venue S, i.e., |QD| > |QS|. We thus term venue D as the
dominant market, and venue S as the satellite market. Note that the sign of the global
order flow is equal to the sign of the liquidity demand routed to venue D.
Intermediaries’ reservation price. Liquidity is supplied by two intermediaries i = 1, 2.
Each intermediary i is endowed with a nonzero inventory position of the risky asset Ii,
where Ii is the realization of the random variable I˜i uniformly distributed on [Id, Iu].
Intermediaries are risk-averse and have the following common CARA utility function:
u (w˜i) = − exp(−ρw˜i), (1)
where ρ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, and w˜i the terminal wealth of market-
maker i. All random variables are independent and their distributions are common knowl-
edge.
As Ho and Stoll (1983) demonstrate, market-maker i’s reservation price ri to execute
the incoming liquidity demand Q is such that:
ri (Q) = µ− ρσ2Ii + ρσ
2
2
Q. (2)
Note that the marginal valuation of intermediary i, (µ − ρσ2Ii), depends on the risk of
holding an inventory position. An intermediary in a long position is reluctant to increase
her exposure to inventory risk and therefore posts relatively low ask and bid prices to
attract sell orders. The second component of reservation prices (ρσ
2Q
2
) represents the
price impact of a trade and is thus increasing in the trade size Q. For ease of exposition,
in what follows we consider that market-maker 1 is endowed with a longer inventory
position, i.e., I1 ≥ I2.
1In the base model, the global order flow exogenously fragments across venues D and S. We address
the case of endogenizing order flow by, say, a global liquidity demander that would optimally split orders
across venues through a smart order routing engine in section 2.4.1.
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Quoting strategies of multi-venue intermediaries. We assume that intermediaries
have access to all trading venues at the same time. Conditional on observing QD and
QS, multi-venue market-makers thus post simultaneously their quotes in venues D and
S. The market-maker who posts the lowest ask price (resp. highest bid price) in venue
m executes Qm > 0 (resp. Qm < 0), for m = D,S.
A multi-venue quoting strategy for market-maker i is a couple of quoted prices (pDi , p
S
i )
where pDi is the price posted by market-maker i in market D and p
S
i is the price posted
by i in market S (which is an ask price if Qm > 0 or a bid price if Qm < 0). In the next
section, we analyze the Nash equilibria of the quoting game.
Note that in our set-up, market-makers must manage their inventory by keeping track
of orders across all trading venues. Because making the market “globally” (i.e., across
various venues) affects intermediary’s total exposure to inventory risk, only aggregate
inventory matters as opposed to ordinary inventory that guides an intermediary taking
risks just in one venue.2
Figure 2 shows the extensive form of the trading game. We denote ζm the probability
that a liquidity shock hits venue m (m = D,S) and assume that ζD > ζS (consistently
with venue D being the dominant market). The probability that shocks simultaneously
hit both venues is denoted λ (≡ ζD × ζS). The cases in which there is only one shock
(either in venue D or S) occurring with probability (1 − λ) are not explicitly analyzed
(because they correspond to the case of a single venue already analyzed in the literature).
The probability that shocks have the same sign is γ. The analysis of price formation
across venues provided below is restricted to the case in which the global order flow is
net-buying QD + QS > 0 (with probability λ/2) and thus such that QD > 0, while QS
might be a buy or sell liquidity demand: QS > 0 (with probability γ) or QS < 0 (with
probability (1− γ)). Symmetric results are obtained for a net-selling global order flow.
[INSERT FIGURE 2]
2Our definition of aggregate inventory is close to the definition of equivalent or total inventory em-
phasized by Ho and Stoll (1983) and discussed in Naik and Yadav (2003). However, while equivalent
inventory is the overall position of an intermediary across all stocks, aggregate inventory is the cumulated
net inventory position of an intermediary in a single stock but across all available trading venues.
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2.2 Equilibrium quotes in fragmented markets
Consider the benchmark case in which liquidity demands are batched and sent to a single
venue, which is the case analyzed by Ho and Stoll (1983). The market-maker with the
longer inventory position (market-maker 1 by assumption) posts the most competitive ask
price, by quoting the reservation price of her shorter opponent ((abatch)∗ = r2(QD+QS)−ε,
where ε corresponds to one tick). This section analyzes how market fragmentation alters
this result.
2.2.1 Preliminary results
The outcome of whether or not the fragmented order flow might be consolidated ex post
(through the execution by a single intermediary) depends on the conditions described by
Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 Assume that I1 > I2 and that QD +QS > 0.
1. If (I1− I2−QD)QS ≤ 0, and if an equilibrium exists, then it is such that the global
order flow remains fragmented: orders submitted to the different venues are executed by
different intermediaries. Conversely, if (I1−I2−QD)QS > 0, and if an equilibrium exists,
then it is characterized by the ex post consolidation of the global order flow, through a
multi-venue execution by a single intermediary.
2. If there exists an equilibrium such that the global order flow remains fragmented
ex post, then the longer intermediary absorbs the shock of the dominant venue, while the
shorter intermediary absorbs the shock of the satellite venue. If there exists an equilibrium
characterized by the ex post consolidation of the order flow, then the longer intermediary
executes the global order flow.
Lemma 1 states the conditions that determine whether the global order flow is ex
post consolidated or remains fragmented, viz.: (i) the price impact of a single or multiple
trades, (ii) intermediaries’ aggregate inventory and (iii) the divergence in intermediaries’
inventories.
First, when shocks have the same sign, the price impact of trading in the two venues
is cumulative. When shocks have opposite signs, the converse offsetting effect is observed:
trading in both venues enables intermediaries to reduce the price impact of a single trade.
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Second, in our model, intermediaries’ inventory is affected by all trades, either in venue
S or in venue D. Intermediaries’ willingness to trade thus depends on their aggregate
inventory position across all venues. By assumption, market-maker 1 is endowed with a
larger aggregate inventory (I1 > I2). She faces more needs to sell than market-maker 2.
She is thus willing to post more aggressive selling prices across venues on average. Price
aggressiveness however depends on the competition induced by market-maker 2, which in
turn depends on his aggregate inventory.
Third, intermediaries’ willingness to absorb a single or multiple shocks depends on the
divergence in their aggregate inventories. When the divergence is high (I1 − I2 > QD),
market-maker 1’s inventory is very large, she is willing to execute all possible buy orders to
lay off her inventory, i.e., to execute QD+QS when QD and QS have the same sign, or only
execute QD when QD and QS have opposite signs. In the latter case, absorbing QS < 0
would instead exacerbate her inventory exposure. When the divergence in inventories is
low (I1− I2 ≤ QD), it is more profitable for her to absorb less buy orders, i.e., either only
QD when shocks have same signs, or QD +QS when shocks have opposite signs.
Note that liquidity demands across venues can be interpreted as substitutes (resp.
complements) when QD and QS have the same signs, since the marginal gain of trading
QD > 0 when a market-maker also trades QS > 0 is lower (resp. higher) than when she
does not trade QS. Substitutability is a key determinant of our results, in line with the
outcome of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for combinatorial auctions.3
2.2.2 Equilibrium quotes
In our model, best prices might differ across venues for two reasons.4 First, intermedi-
aries are not constrained to post competitive prices for the entire order flow, and may
choose to compete just in a single venue. Second, intermediaries post quotes reflecting
the price impact of trades of different size (second-degree price differentiation). Besides,
3In combinatorial auctions, multiple items, which are related but not necessarily identical (like the
multiple shocks in our model), are sold simultaneously. Bidders may submit bids on packages of items. A
single bidder wins the bundle of items in the VCG mechanism under a condition similar to the one under
which an intermediary absorbs all shocks (ex post consolidation), as stated by Lemma 1. See Vickrey
(1961), Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973) or Ausubel and Milgrom (2006) for a discussion of the VCG
mechanism.
4In Europe, a consolidated tape in which all trades and quotes of all exchanges and multi-trading
facilities would be recorded does not exist, orders sometimes execute at prices which may differ from the
best existing quoted prices in the market (trade-throughs are allowed).
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it is worth noticing that, similar to inventory models in a single venue like Ho and Stoll
(1983) or Biais (1993), the divergence in intermediaries’ inventories is a determinant of the
competitiveness of their quotes across venues. When the divergence is low (resp. high),
market-maker 1’s inventory position is close to (resp. away from) that of market-maker 2,
and market-makers are less (resp. more) able to post aggressive prices. The combination
of these characteristics leads to unexpected intra-venues competition effects resulting in
equilibrium prices described by Proposition 1 below.
Proposition 1 Assume that I1 > I2 and QD +QS > 0.
1. If (I1−I2−QD)QS > 0, there exists a Nash equilibrium, in which market-maker 1, with
the larger inventory, consolidates the global order flow by posting the best prices across
venues, while market-maker 2, with the smaller inventory, quotes his own reservation
prices, that is:
1.1. If QS > 0, market-maker 1 posts the best ask prices in venue D and venue S:
(
(aD1 )
∗, (aS1 )
∗) = (r2(QD)− ε, r2(QS)− ε) ;
1.2. If QS < 0, market-maker 1 posts the best ask price in venue D and the best bid
price in venue S:
(
(
aD1
)∗
,
(
bS1
)∗
) = (r2(QD)− ρσ2 (−QS)− ε, r2 (QS) + ε);
2. If (I1 − I2 − QD)QS ≤ 0, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, in which market-
maker 1, holding the larger inventory, posts the best price in the dominant market while
market-maker 2 posts the best price in the satellite market, that is:
2.1. If QS > 0, market-makers post the following ask prices in venues D and S:
(
(aD1 )
∗, aS1
)
=
(
r2(QD) + ρσ
2QS
(
QD − (I1 − I2)
QD
)
− ε, r1(QS) + ρσ2QD
)
,
(
aD2 , (a
S
2 )
∗) = (r2(QD) + ρσ2QS (QD − (I1 − I2)
QD
)
, r1(QS) + ρσ
2QD − ε
)
;
2.2. If QS < 0, market-makers post the following ask prices in venue D and bid prices
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in venue S:
(
(aD1 )
∗, bS1
)
=
(
r2(QD)− ρσ2(−QS)− ε, r1(QS) + ρσ2QD
)
,(
aD2 , (b
S
2 )
∗) = (r2(QD)− ρσ2(−QS), r1(QS) + ρσ2QD + ε) ;
where ε corresponds to one tick.
To help to understand Proposition 1, we use Figure 3, which shows the best prices as
a function of the divergence in inventories. Panel A illustrates the case in which two buy
shocks simultaneously hit venue D and venue S. Panel B illustrates the case of shocks
of opposite directions. In both cases, the vertical line QD separates the region in which
the divergence in intermediaries’ inventories is high (the right-hand side of the graph,
corresponding to I1 − I2 > QD) from the region in which divergence is low (the left-hand
side, corresponding to I1 − I2 ≤ QD).
[INSERT FIGURE 3]
The case of simultaneous buy shocks. Panel A shows that when the divergence
in inventories is high, equilibrium selling prices ((aD)∗ and (aS)∗) are more competitive
than the benchmark price. Market-maker 1’s inventory is so large (compared to her
opponent’s) that she is willing to absorb both shocks. Market-maker 2 might however
choose to compete in a single venue, forcing market-maker 1 to post more aggressive
prices across venues to be sure to consolidate the entire order flow. In this case, ex ante
fragmentation (the existence of multiple venues) increases intra-venue competition leading
to consolidation ex post. Accordingly, relative to the benchmark, ex post transaction costs
are lower: TC − TCbatch = (aD)∗QD + (aS)∗QS − (abatch)∗(QD +QS) = −ρσ2QDQS < 0.
Consider the case of a low divergence in inventories, illustrated by the region to the left
of the vertical line QD. As the divergence in inventories decreases, equilibrium ask prices
are less and less competitive compared to the benchmark. Interestingly, the equilibrium
selling price in the satellite venue might even be higher than the one of the dominant venue
despite a smaller quantity to execute. The intuition for this result is as follows. First, in
this region, market-maker 1 is not ready to execute the entire order flow since her inventory
is large but not very divergent.5 She is keen to absorb the single larger buy shock, which
5This situation might be interpreted as a capacity constraint in our two-sided two-market Bertrand
competition model with asymmetric costs among liquidity suppliers.
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provides the best way to reduce her inventory imbalance, and reluctant to absorb the
other buy shock in the satellite venue. She therefore posts less competitive prices in the
satellite venue letting her opponent absorb the smaller shock in that venue. This results in
ex post fragmentation of the global order flow. Second, when I1−I2 → QD, market-maker
1 is indifferent between executing the entire order flow or the single liquidity demand QD
because her trading profits are identical.6 At the other extreme, when I1−I2 → 0, market-
makers’ profits are equal (where there is no divergence, market-makers’ private values are
symmetric). At the limit, the longer market-maker executes the larger demand, while
the shorter market-maker executes the smaller demand. A higher equilibrium price in
the satellite market must therefore compensate the smaller quantity executed by market-
maker 2 for the equal profits condition to hold. In between these extreme cases, as we
move leftwards from the vertical line QD to the y-axis, the equilibrium ask price in the
satellite market varies from smaller to higher than that in the dominant market. Therefore
there exists an intersection point p at which selling prices are equal across venues leading
to an outcome identical to the benchmark.7
In this region of low divergence in inventories, ex ante fragmentation has an ambiguous
effect on price competition. To the left of p, intermediaries cannot post very different
prices because their inventories are closer, and competition is weaker (TC−TCbatch ≥ 0).
To the right of p, inventories are more divergent, prices are more competitive, and ex post
transaction costs are smaller than those paid in the benchmark: TC − TCbatch < 0.
The case of opposite shocks. Panel B illustrates the case of shocks of opposite sign.
Subfigure (a) depicts the best selling price in the dominant venue (which is hit by a buy
shock) as a function of divergence in inventories. Subfigure (b) draws the best buying price
in the satellite venue (which is hit by a sell shock). Panel B shows that price competition
between intermediaries is weaker compared to the one existing when shocks have the same
signs.
The equilibrium selling price in venue D (aD)∗ is more competitive than the benchmark
price. The opposite holds in the satellite venue. The best buying price is less and less
competitive as the divergence in inventories increases. When market-maker 1’s inventory
6Note that, when I1−I2 → QD market-maker 2 is indifferent between executing nothing or QS because
he has zero profit in both cases.
7At p, we can show that the binding constraint is the following: market-maker 1 must be indifferent
to execute only QD or the entire order flow QD +QS .
12
is large (the region to the right of the vertical line QD), she is very keen to execute the buy
demand QD to mean-revert her inventory. Simultaneously, she is reluctant to add more
inventory by executing the sell demand QS. This is anticipated by market-maker 2 who
therefore posts a non aggressive price in venue S, less and less aggressive that market-
maker 1 inventory is larger. Ex post transaction costs thus worsen: TC − TCbatch =
ρσ2(I1−I2−QD)(−QS) ≥ 0 in this region. In contrast, when market-maker 1’ s inventory
is close to her competitor’s (the region to the left of the vertical line QD), she is willing to
execute the entire order flow QD +QS to benefit from the offsetting effect. Executing the
entire order flow has a smaller impact on inventory compared to a single trade in venue D
or S. The ability of market-maker 2 to compete in just one venue forces market-maker 1
to post attractive, but not too aggressive prices due to the low divergence in inventories.
In this case of ex post consolidation of the entire order flow, there is a multiplicity of
equilibria. We select the equilibrium in which there is price continuity at I1 − I2 = QD
in venue D. At any equilibrium though, the weighted averaged price paid by liquidity
demanders is equal to r2(QD +QS), that is, the price formed at equilibrium in the batch
auction. Ex post transaction costs are thus equal to those paid in the benchmark in this
region.
It is worth noticing that in case the global order flow remains fragmented (“Ex post
fragmentation”), intermediaries obtain a better allocation of risk compared to the batch
auction, as shown in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 The fragmented market generates a more efficient outcome in risk sharing
among intermediaries than the batch market in the sense that intermediaries bear lower
aggregate security risk in the fragmented market.
The better allocation of risk does not however necessarily lead to more competitive prices
as detailed above since intermediaries have less incentives to undercut each other. This
result is in the spirit of the one obtained in Biais et al (1998).
2.3 Assessing ex ante execution quality
In our model, because intermediaries manage their inventory globally, they place quotes
in one venue taking into account the impact of a potential trade in the other venue.
The interdependent quoting aggressiveness across venues in turn impacts local liquidity,
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measured here by bid-ask spreads, and global liquidity.
2.3.1 Interconnected liquidity
Using Proposition 1, we compute the expected (half-) spreads in the dominant and the
satellite venues for any set of inventory positions and any sign for liquidity demands QD
and QS. For ease of exposition, we denote by φm the magnitude of the shock routed to
venue m scaled by the distribution support (Iu − Id): −φm = QmIu−Id for a sell shock and
φm =
Qm
Iu−Id for a buy shock (m = D,S). Proposition 2 follows.
Proposition 2 Under the assumption that φD < 1, the expected (half-) spreads in the
dominant and the satellite venues respectively write:
E
(
sD
)
= ρσ2(Iu − Id)
[
1
2
(φD − 2Id + Iu
3
) + ζSφS
[
γ(φD − (φD)
2
3
)− (1− γ)
]]
, (3)
E
(
sS
)
= ρσ2(Iu − Id)
[
1
2
(φS − 2Id + Iu
3
) + ζDφD
[
φD − (φD)
2
3
− (1− γ)
]]
, (4)
where γ is the probability that order flows routed to D and to S have the same sign and
ζm is the probability that a liquidity shock hits venue m (m = D,S).
In line with the intuition explained above, the first component of the expected best offer
in the two venues (Eq. (3) and (4)) is the direct price impact of the order flow routed
to that venue. It corresponds to the expected best offer that would prevail if φ−m is zero
(with probability 1−ζ−m). The second component consists of the indirect price impact of
trading in another venue (φ−m) resulting from the interdependent quoting strategies across
venues. This impact may be positive or negative depending on the value of the parameters
γ and φD. In particular, expected spreads in the two venues are increasing with γ the
probability that shocks have the same signs across venues. When γ is high (γ → 1), local
expected spreads are negatively impacted by ex ante fragmentation. Interestingly if γ is
sufficiently low, the opposite occurs. This result suggests that the empirical findings of
Degryse et al (2014) uncovering a negative impact of fragmentation on local liquidity (that
is, on E(sm)) might be explained by a high probability to observe order flows with the
same signs across venues. It is also worth noticing that the shock that hits the dominant
market has a bigger impact on spreads in the satellite market than the reverse (given that
ζD > ζS, φD > φS, and (1− γ)(φD − (φD)23 ) ≥ 0).
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Proposition 2 shows that local expected spreads are indirectly influenced by orders
sent to other venues due to the presence of strategic multi-venue intermediaries. They
make the liquidity (measured by quoted spreads) of different venues interrelated in our
model, as stated by the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 Spreads co-vary jointly:
cov(sD, sS) = λ
(
ρσ2(Iu − Id)
)2[3γ − 1
36
− (φD)2
(
1
6
− 2
9
φD + γ
(φD)
2
12
)
− γφDφS
(
(φD)
4
9
− 2(φD)
3
3
+
5(φD)
2
4
− 8φD
9
+
1
6
)]
(5)
where λ = ζDζS is the probability to observe two simultaneous shocks in venues D and S.
Our model therefore proposes a new explanation for the interconnectedness of trading
venues, namely the inventory management strategies of multi-venues market-makers. This
explanation is distinct from those found in the literature which have focused on arbitrage
strategies (Foucault et al, 2014; Rahi and Zigrand, 2013), duplicate strategies (van Kervel,
2014) or directional trading strategies (Chowdhry and Nanda, 1991).8
2.3.2 Market quality
While the previous section analyzes local liquidity, this section investigates global liquidity
(measured by ex ante total transaction costs) to determine whether market performance
improves or worsens when liquidity is strategically supplied across multiple venues.
From Proposition 2, we compute expected transaction costs in a fragmented market.
The next corollary compares them to expected transaction costs that would prevail in a
batch market (our benchmark).
Corollary 2 Expected transaction costs are lower in a fragmented market than in a batch
market if and only if γ > 1
3
and φD is neither too large, nor too small (Φ
1
γ < φD < Φ
2
γ).
The intuition of the corollary is as follows. First, recall that ex post transaction costs
are strictly lower in a fragmented market when shocks have the same signs. In particular,
competition heats up when there is a high divergence in inventories. Therefore, if the
8See Cespa and Foucault (2014) for interconnectedness across different assets.
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probability to observe shocks of the same signs is high (γ → 1), the probability to observe
more aggressive quoting strategies than in the benchmark increases with the probability of
a high divergence in inventories, i.e., φD should not be too large (φD < Φ
2
γ). Conversely,
when shocks are more likely to have opposite sign (γ → 1/3), quoting aggressiveness
increases with the probability of low divergence in inventories, i.e., φD should not be too
small (Φ1γ < φD). Note that when the probability to get shocks of opposite sign is too
high (γ < 1/3), transaction costs are always larger in a fragmented market.
From Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 we deduce that when the probability of having
shocks of the same sign is high, even if local spreads are in average larger, global liquidity
improves due to a stronger competition across venues. The opposite effect is found when
the probability of having shocks of opposite sign is high.
The ambiguous result of multi-venue market-making on market performance is consis-
tent with the mixed empirical evidence investigating the impact of market fragmentation
(see, e.g., the literature review in O’Hara and Ye, 2011). In our model, there exist cases
in which the longer market-maker competes fiercely to consolidate the fragmented or-
der flow, which has a positive impact on transaction costs. Opposite effects are found
when she refrains to compete for the entire order flow and restricts competition to a single
venue. Few theoretical models find positive impacts of fragmentation of trading. Foucault
and Menkveld (2008) show that even if time priority is not enforced across limit order
books, the consolidated depth may be larger due to the presence of liquidity suppliers who
consolidate the market through their queue jumping strategy across limit order books.
2.4 Discussion
The aim of this section is to assess the impact of relaxing some of the model’s assumptions.
We analyze two extensions. First, we relax the hypothesis that the market is exogenously
fragmented. Second, we investigate whether intermediaries would prefer trading and
sharing risks together in a pre-trading stage.
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2.4.1 Endogenous fragmentation of the total order flow
Consider the case of a global liquidity demander that must trade a given quantity denoted
Q. He optimizes execution costs and thus splits optimally orders across venues.9 Note
that the strategic decision to spatially split up orders extends the case in which shocks
have exogenously the same sign in our previous set-up. As in section 2.1, we suppose
that market-maker 1 is longer than market-maker 2 and that Q is a buy order flow, i.e.,
Q > 0 (results for the case of a sell order flow, or when market-maker 2 is longer than
market-maker 1, are deduced by symmetry).
We consider that the global liquidity demander enjoys some private benefits denoted
δm to trade in venue m. We assume that δD > δS, consistently with the dominant
market defined above, and that δD − δS < ρσ2Q.10,11 The liquidity demander chooses
the proportion α of the order flow routed to market D (and (1 − α) to market S) so
as to minimize transaction costs.12 We show that there exists an equilibrium such that
α ∈ [1
2
; 1), that is, such that the liquidity demander optimally splits orders across venues
and sends a larger demand to the dominant market.13 In this interval, transaction costs
write:
TC(α) = [((aD)∗(αQ)− δD − µ)α + ((aS)∗((1− α)Q)− δS − µ)(1− α)]×Q.
In the Appendix, we show the existence and the characterization of an equilibrium α∗.
This yields the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If r2(Q) − r1(Q) > (δD − δS), there exists an interior equilibrium α∗,
such that it is optimal for the global liquidity demander to split orders across venues.
9See Degryse et al (2013) for an analysis of “order splitting” by liquidity demanders over time rather
than over venues.
10Numerous studies (Froot and Dabora, 1999; Gagnon and Karolyi, 2010; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999;
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; or Stulz, 2005) document the existence of a domestic bias, due to investment
barriers, e.g., regulatory barriers, taxes, or information constraints. In Europe, brokerage fees charged
in 2013 to trade in a foreign country or trading venue are 15 to 40% higher than those charged to trade
in a national exchange, but the situation was even worse back in 2007 (see documents on Fees and
Commissions of various brokers from 2007 to 2013). Differences in private benefits might also capture
differences in terms of maker/taker spreads.
11When δD−δS ≥ ρσ2Q, the private benefits of trading in venue D are so large that it is never optimal
for investors to split the quantity to be traded across trading platforms.
12Because markets are transparent in our set up, we assume that liquidity demanders perfectly antici-
pate what the best bid and ask prices are.
13A complete proof of the existence and characterization of all the equilibria is available on request.
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The liquidity demander trades off the benefits of price competition through fragmentation
(related to the divergence of inventories, I1 − I2) to the private benefits of sending the
entire demand to the dominant market (δD−δS), that is, when r2(Q)−r1(Q) > (δD − δS).
We conclude that, even when the demand splitting is endogenized, it is still the case that
the market remains ex ante fragmented.
2.4.2 Introduction of an inter-dealer market
In this section, we analyze if our results are sensitive to the introduction of an inter-dealer
market in which intermediaries are able to optimally share inventory risks (stage 1) before
setting quotes in the customer-dealer market (stage 2). It could be the case that they
prefer sharing risks in an inter-dealer market to avoid multi-venue competition in the
customer-dealer market.
In a conservative approach, we assume that intermediaries independently and unstrate-
gically maximize their expected profit in the inter-dealer market, then their expected profit
in the customer-dealer market (the model is solved sequentially).14
In the first stage, we find that at the symmetric equilibrium, intermediaries perfectly
share inventory risk in the inter-dealer market, that is, they trade a quantity q∗ = I1−I2
2
at price p∗ = µ− ρσ2 I1+I2
2
such that their new inventory positions (I ′1, I
′
2) write I
′
1 = I
′
2 =
I1+I2
2
. In the second stage, we simply use the equilibrium in the customer-dealer market
derived in section 2.2 for the limit case where I ′1 → I ′2. Finally, we compute and compare
the intermediaries’ expected profits whether they trade or not in the inter-dealer market.
This yields the following corollary.
Corollary 3 The set of parameters for which intermediaries choose not to trade in the
inter-dealer market is non-empty.
As illustrated by Figure 4, there exist cases (white squared surface) in which intermediaries
find more profitable ex ante not to trade in the inter-dealer market (for different values
of γ and qS) and trade directly in the customer-dealer market.
14In the case in which intermediaries strategically trade in the inter-dealer market after observing
the realization of the order flows in venue D and S, we find that they may find optimal to reinforce
the divergence in inventories in order to maximize their trading profit in the customer-dealer market.
The inter-dealer market is not a way to optimize risk-sharing, but to enhance divergence in inventories.
Multi-venue competition in the customer-dealer is thus emphasized in this case.
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2.5 Testable implications
To establish the external validity of our modeling approach, we adopt a two-step empirical
strategy. In the first step, we investigate whether inventory effects across venues are
present in the Euronext limit-order book environment. This step is meant to empirically
validate our assumption that aggregate inventory is a driver of intermediaries multi-venue
market-making strategies.15 In the second step, we proceed to test the main prediction
of our model, derived from Proposition 1.
2.5.1 Testing the validity of a cross-venue inventory model
Our model assumes that intermediary i’ multi-venue market-making strategy is governed
by her aggregate inventory, defined at time t as the cumulated net volume of transactions
across all trading venues : Ii,t = Ii,0 +
∑τ=t
τ=0QD,τ +
∑τ=t
τ=0QS,τ where Ii,0 is the initial in-
ventory. Our model implies that intermediaries should react to a change in their aggregate
inventory by adjusting quotes in all venues. In particular, after a trade, say in venue S,
that increases the inventory exposure, a multi-venue intermediary should update quotes
in venue S, but also in venue D to elicit inventory-reducing orders. We specifically focus
on cross-venue inventory effects that, to the best of our knowledge, have never been inves-
tigated. Formulating our hypothesis in the context of the limit-order-book environment of
Euronext, we test whether, for instance, after executing a sell order in the satellite venue
that increases the total inventory exposure, a multi-venue market-maker is more likely to
cancel an existing buy order in the dominant market, or modify it for a less aggressive
price (negative revision), or post a new sell limit order in the dominant market or modify
an existing sell order for a more aggressive price (positive revision). We thus posit the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Multi-venue market-makers should update existing limit orders or submit
new orders in one venue after a trade in another venue, in a direction that is associated
with their inventory changes.
15The literature has so far focused mostly on within-venue inventory effects in the context of dealer
markets and the specialist-based model of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). See, among others,
Hansh et al (1998) and Reiss and Werner (1998) for London equity dealers, Bjønnes and Rime (2005)
for foreign exchange dealers, Panayide`s (2007) for NYSE specialists. Raman and Yadav (2014) uncover
some within-venue inventory effects for limit order traders on the National Stock Exchange, India.
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We acknowledge that other trading strategies, such as cross-venue arbitrage, could lead
to order placement patterns that resemble those due to inventory considerations. In case,
say, the bid price in venue S jumps above the best ask in venue D, an arbitrageur might
step in and sell one share in venue S, and buy one in venue D to reduce the existing price
discrepancy. The buy and sell orders submissions from the arbitrageur are empirically
similar to inventory-driven strategies. A way to distinguish these strategies is to take into
account the aggressiveness of the initial transaction. In case there is an arbitrage oppor-
tunity, we expect arbitrageurs to post aggressive orders in a venue simultaneously/after
an active transaction in another venue.16 In contrast, after a passive transaction (existing
limit orders passively hit), we expect more messages related to inventory management.
We thus control for arbitrage opportunities and for the transaction aggressiveness in our
empirical analysis.
2.5.2 Testing the main prediction of the model
Proposition 1 describes equilibrium prices in the dominant and satellite venues. Within
venue, for the same liquidity demand, price competitiveness varies with the sign of the
shock to absorb in the other venue and with the divergence in intermediaries’ inventories.
As illustrated by Figure 3, when shocks across venues have the same signs, competition
gets more intense as the divergence in inventories increases. We thus expect tighter bid-
ask spreads when both conditions hold simultaneously. We thus deduce the following
hypothesis :
Hypothesis 2 Variations in spreads in one venue depend on both the directions of order
flows across venues (identical or opposite), and the divergence in intermediaries’ inven-
tories.
Note that spreads vary more with the divergence in inventories in the satellite venue than
in the dominant venue. In particular, when shocks have the same sign and divergence in
inventories is low, competition is weaker than in the dominant venue. Recall that, despite
a shock of a smaller magnitude, the best ask price in the satellite venue is higher than
the one in the dominant venue (region to the left of the point p on Figure 3). In contrast,
16We call a transaction “active” when intermediaries trade through a liquidity demanding order like a
market or marketable order.
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when divergence is high (region to the right of the vertical line QD), competition heats
up and the best ask price in the satellite venue is smaller than in the dominant venue
(reflecting a smaller quantity to absorb).
This prediction is interesting because it allows us to distinguish our theory from a
competing adverse-selection hypothesis: in case an informed trader would split his orders
across venues, the adverse selection component of multi-venue market-makers should in-
crease. Transaction costs, measured by quoted bid-ask spreads, should thus increase in
all venues if order flows across venues have same direction. Our model predicts however
that if we introduce an interaction term between the order flow direction and a measure
of divergence in inventories, it should have a negative impact on spreads.17
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Forming the sample
Our analysis uses a proprietary dataset from Euronext on multi-listed stocks. Euronext
was created in 2000 as a result of the merger of three European exchanges, namely Ams-
terdam, Brussels and Paris. The Lisbon exchange joined in 2002. Before the introduction
of the Universal Trading Platform (UTP) in 2009, each of the four exchanges maintained
their domestic market. As a result, firms could be multi-listed on several Euronext ex-
changes; for example, Suez was traded in Paris and Brussels.
Our sample consists of all multi-traded stocks within Euronext, spanning four months
(79 trading days) from January 1, 2007 to April 30, 2007.18 The data on orders and quotes
are provided by Euronext. Euronext files also provide us with the identification of the
member participating in each quote or transaction, and whether the member is acting as
an agent or as a principal (that is, either as a proprietary trader or an exchange-regulated
market maker). The data assigns a unique identifier to each member, enabling us to trace
members’ inventory changes and quoting behavior across time, across stocks, and across
exchanges. During the sample period, Euronext exchanges followed the same market
17Comerton-Forde et al (2010) relate variations in spreads and specialists’ inventories. They focus
however on the level of inventories aggregated across all specialists to show that this measure and the
tightness of the funding market significantly impact variations in spreads on the NYSE.
18Four trading days are dropped in January due to missing data about best limits.
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model (same trading hours, and same trading rules), and the payment of membership
fees granted access to all Euronext markets. Note also that, during this period (pre-
MiFID environment), trading was concentrated in Euronext.19 For all these reasons,
Euronext is an excellent environment to test the predictions of our model. Other stock-
level information comes from Compustat Global.
We keep firms that trade in euros using a continuous trading session in at least two
exchanges on which they are traded. We also restrict our analysis to members acting in
their capacity as a principal who post order messages (submission, revision, cancellation)
and trade at least once in each of the two exchanges on which the stock is traded. Over-
all, we follow 46 members, denominated as “multi-venue intermediaries”. Because these
members do not necessarily follow the same stocks, our sample finally consists of 178 pairs
(stock, member), among which 20% involve an exchange-regulated market-maker, called
thereafter Designated Market-Maker (DMM) (see Panel C of Table 1).20
The final sample contains 20 firms with at least one multi-venue intermediary, trading
continuously in two Euronext exchanges. Among them, 11 are traded on Euronext Am-
sterdam, 12 are traded on Euronext Brussels and 17 on Euronext Paris. To determine
which is the dominant market (market D in the model) and which is the satellite mar-
ket (market S in the model), we use the primary market as the (exogenous) dominant
platform.
3.1.1 Measuring liquidity
We measure the spread in the market m as the equally-weighted average bid-ask spread
for stock j, during a twenty-minutes interval t.21 We focus on the relative bid-ask spread
RBAS m, and the variation of the relative spread between two consecutive intervals,
∆RBAS m, where m = DOM,SAT .
19Some French stocks were traded on the London Stock Exchange or the Deutsche Bo¨erse, while some
Dutch stocks were traded in Xetra. Gresse (2012) finds a market share of 96.45% for CAC40 stocks
and even 99.99% for other SBF120 stocks in October 2007. Degryse et al (2014) show that Euronext
concentrates the trading volume of the 52 Amsterdam Exchange Index Large and Mid cap constituents
on our sample period.
20Our paper does not compare the liquidity provision of exchange-regulated market-makers versus
endogenous market-makers, as Anand and Venkatamaran (2014) do using Toronto Stock Exchange data.
We however keep trace of their difference in trading behaviors as suggested by the literature.
21We compute both equally-weighted and time-weighted averages of the quoted spreads. As the results
for the two weighting schemes are virtually identical, we restrict the presentation to the equally-weighted
spread measures.
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3.1.2 Measuring aggregate inventory
In our dataset, the initial inventory position (I0) of members is not observable. Moreover,
members differ in the amount of capital at risk they commit to their trading activities
and/or in their risk aversion, which makes inventories not comparable to each other. We
thus follow Hansh et al’s (1998) methodology by building standardized inventory positions
to deal with these unobservable characteristics. Let IP si,t denote the inventory position of
multi-venue intermediary i in stock s at the end of day t. We use the record of all trades
executed by i across venues, plus the direction of these trades to obtain her inventory.
We thus construct a time series for each intermediary’s inventory position in each stock
across all Euronext venues from the start to the end of our sample period. Since at the
time more than 95% of the volumes were traded in Euronext, our inventory variable is a
good proxy for intermediaries’ aggregate inventories. We compute the mean (IP
s
i ) and
the standard deviation (σsi ) for each of these inventory series. The standardized inventory
is defined as
Isi,t =
IP si,t − IP si
σsi
.
We then build a measure of divergence in inventories. Let IsM,t denote the median
inventory at time t in stock s, and let IDi,t = |Isi,t− IsM,t| denote the member i’s inventory
position relative to the median inventory. The larger IDi, the more divergent the inventory
position of member i relative to the median is, and the more aggressively she will quote,
in order to reduce her inventory exposure (Hansh et al, 1998). We take the mean of
inventory divergence across intermediaries at time t in each stock s, RI
s
t , to get a proxy
of divergence in intermediaries’ inventories (I1 − I2 in our model).
3.1.3 Determining the direction of order flows across venues
The model’s predictions depend on whether liquidity demands sent across venues have the
same or the opposite direction. We proxy liquidity demand by the net order flow in market
m (i.e., trade imbalance) in stock s during a twenty-minutes interval t, TrIMB m, as
the number of buyer-initiated trades minus the number of seller-initiated trades.22 The
dummy variable d POS takes the value of one if order flows have the same direction
across venues (TrIMB DOM × TrIMB SAT > 0) on a given twenty-minutes interval,
22Note that our data specify the sign of trades.
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and zero otherwise. Note that we exclude the first and last five minutes of trading in
order to avoid contamination by specific trading behaviors during the open or close of the
markets.23
3.1.4 Control variables
In our regression specifications, we control for the existence of arbitrage opportunities.
This is necessary because, by buying the asset in one venue and reselling it in the other
venue, arbitrageurs behave as inventory-driven market-makers. The dummy d AO takes
the value of one if the best bid in one venue exceeds the best ask in the other venue, i.e.,
max(Bid SAT ,Bid DOM) > min(Ask SAT ,Ask DOM). We also expect arbitrageurs
to use more often active transactions (marketable orders) than passive transactions (non-
aggressive limit orders) to take fast arbitrage opportunities. We thus use the dummy
d AT which takes the value of one if the origin of transaction executed by the member is
a market/marketable order, and zero if it is a limit order hit. In some regressions, we also
control for the pending time to the next market close (TimeClos), the (log) transaction
size in number of shares (TrSize), and the number of trades NbTr.
3.2 Summary statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our sample. Panel A presents statistics across
stocks. The average (median) firm has a stock price of 53.3 (50.09) Euros, a market cap
of 30.6 (20.4) billion Euros, and 9 (5) multi-venue intermediaries trading on the stock.
There is an average number of 3 realized arbitrage opportunities per day, and 59% of order
flows across venues have the same direction. Panel B presents statistics computed within
each market. Relative (quoted) spreads of the satellite market are five to ten times larger
than those of the dominant market, depending if one takes means or medians. The daily
number of trades is much smaller (twenty five times less in average) in the satellite market,
reflecting lack of trade activity, and transaction size is also much smaller. Surprisingly,
the daily number of best limit updates is only three times less in average in the satellite
venue. This suggests that the satellite market is not a very active trading place, but it
is closely monitored. T-tests of the difference in means between the two markets (not
23On February 19, 2007, the closing fixing moved from 5:25 pm to 5:30 pm. We therefore drop all
observations before 9:05 am and after 5:20 pm.
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shown) confirm the statistical significance of these differences. Panel C presents statistics
computed for each multi-venue intermediary. There is considerable heterogeneity in terms
of member trading activity, resulting from our conservative selection. The average multi-
venue member makes 70 trades per day in the dominant market and 9 trades in the satellite
market, but the median member only does 8 and 1 respectively. Panel C also shows the
mean reversion parameter in members’ aggregate inventory, obtained by estimating the
following regression model of inventory time series for each pair (stock, member),
∆Iit = α + βIit−1 + εt,
where ∆Iit is the change in aggregate inventory from the previous trade. Mean reversion
predicts that β < 0 (if β = 0, it has a unit root and it is non-stationary). Across the
178 pairs, Panel C shows that the average mean-reversion parameter (β) is -0.073, which
means that multi-venue members reduce, in average, inventory by 7.3% during the next
trade.
3.3 Multivariate analysis
3.3.1 Inventory management across venues
The first step of our empirical analysis is to validate that inventory management matters
for multi-venue members trading across several limit order books. Panel C already shows
that aggregate inventories of some members are mean-reverting, which is consistent with
the model. We now investigate whether a multi-venue member sends inventory-driven
messages in one venue in response to a transaction in another venue (that is, a transaction
that causes a change in her aggregate inventory). We focus on messages routed to the
dominant market after a transaction in the satellite market, because effects in the more
liquid market should be more easily detected. For example, after a buy in the satellite
market, a multi-venue member should cancel or negatively revise existing buy orders –
or submit new sell orders or positively revise sell orders in the dominant market. The
opposite should occur after a sell. We implement the following Logit regression:
Pr(d i) = α + β1d DMM + β2|Ii,τ−1|+ β3d DMM × |Ii,τ−1|
+β4d AOs,τ + β5log(TrSizes,τ ) + β6TimeCloss,τ + εs,τ , (6)
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where d i is the dummy variable that takes 1 if member i sends a message in the dominant
market in direction of inventory following a trade at time τ in the satellite market.24 The
explanatory variables are the lagged absolute inventory position of member i, the dummy
variable for designated market-makers, and the interaction between both. We control for
the existence of an arbitrage opportunity at the time of the trade, the size of the trade,
and the pending time to the close. Our specification also includes firm fixed-effects to
control for time-invariant firm heterogeneity. We run the regression both after an active
and a passive transaction.
The results of the Logit analysis are presented in Table 2. Panel A reports the results
for order submissions after a passive transaction, while Panel B reports the results for order
submissions after an active transaction. First, in both cases, the likelihood that multi-
venue intermediaries use “inventory-driven” strategies is larger when they are dedicated
market-makers. Second, these trading strategies seem different according to whether the
change in aggregate inventory has been caused by a passive transaction or an active
transaction, consistently with the discussion of Hypothesis 1. The probability to post
cross-venue inventory-driven messages is negatively related to the existence of an arbitrage
opportunity when the transaction is passive, while it is significantly positively related
when it is active.
In particular, Panel A shows that, when the transaction is passive, dedicated market-
makers are more likely to use cross-venue inventory-driven messages, even more likely
when their aggregate inventory is large. This finding validates the assumption of the model
that intermediaries manage inventory risk across multiple venues. When the transaction
is active, Panel B shows that the coefficients of the dummy Arbitrage Opportunity and
the dummy for designated market-maker are positive and significant. This suggests that
multi-venue designated market-makers take arbitrage opportunities by posting aggressive
orders in the two venues. This is in line with the role that Euronext assigns to designated
market-makers in cross-listed stocks. Note that, in this case, the aggregate inventory
of dedicated market-makers has no significant impact, supporting the notion that the
observed sequence of messages is driven by an arbitrage trading strategy.
In summary, these results are consistent with Hypothesis 1 of intermediaries using
cross-venue strategies to manage inventory.
24Messages are tracked through their first 10 seconds after a trade.
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3.3.2 Spreads
To test the main prediction of our model, we estimate the relation between the variation
in twenty-minute bid-ask spreads in the satellite market and the price competition among
multi-venue members which is related to the divergence in their inventories (RI
s
) and to
the direction of order flows across venues (i.e., whether the dummy d POS is equal to
one). We run the following panel regression model:
∆RBAS SAT st = α+β1RI
s
t−1+β2d POS
s
t +β3d POSt×RI t−1+β4NbTr SAT st +εst . (7)
Proposition 1 predicts that the sign of the order flows routed across venues impacts
the spreads. More specifically, we expect the following sign: β2 > 0. We also expect
that in case of a large inventory divergence and same direction of shocks across venues,
members compete more fiercely to execute all orders across venues, implying β3 < 0. This
interaction term allows us to distinguish our predictions from those of a adverse selection
model, since the latter would predict β3 ≥ 0. Finally, the number of trades in the satellite
market, NbTr SAT , controls for the impact of trades.
All specifications include day dummies and use clustered standard errors by stock to
accommodate the possibility that relative spreads are strongly correlated within firms.
Table 3 presents estimation results. We report two specifications: the first with time
fixed effects (Column 1) and the second with day and firm fixed-effects. The main conclu-
sions from the analysis are as follows. First, spreads in the satellite market vary with the
direction of order flows across venues (coeff. 0.108, t-stat. 2.14 in column 1), consistently
with our predictions. Second, the variable of interest which is the interaction term be-
tween the direction of order flows and inventory divergence has a negative and statistical
significant impact on spreads (coeff. -0.12, t-stat. -2.00). Spreads in the satellite market
are thus significantly lower when there exists intermediaries holding large aggregate in-
ventory and when order flows across venues have the same sign, supporting Hypothesis
2. This result is consistent with the case of intense competition among intermediaries
illustrated by the case of “Ex post consolidation” in Panel A of Figure 3, and uniquely
predicted by our model. Results for other control variables are not statistically significant.
Overall, the results in Table 3 corroborate the main implication of the model.
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4 Conclusion
We develop a multi-venue inventory model in which two risk averse intermediaries quote
a single asset in two venues that may be hit simultaneously by shocks of equal or opposite
signs. Intra-venue competition is driven by the divergence in intermediaries’ inventories
and the sign and magnitude of the shock in the other venue. Counter-intuitively, we find
that cases in which market-makers are willing to absorb both shocks, leading to an ex
post consolidation of liquidity. We show that local expected spreads may be positively or
negatively impacted by interdependent market-making strategies across the two venues.
Our model has interesting policy implications as we show that ex ante fragmentation may
decrease total transaction costs (a measure of global liquidity). The intuition for this
result is that intra-venue competition and inter-venue competition are interrelated: the
possibility to compete in a single venue forces in some cases competitors to post aggressive
quotes across all venues.
Our model also yields unique empirical predictions. In particular, we show that local
spread depends: (i) on the way order flow fragments between venues; (ii) on the divergence
of intermediaries’ inventories; and (iii) on the interaction between the two. We exploit
the co-existence of multiple order books for the same security within Euronext to test
our model. First, we uncover new evidence of cross venue inventory effects validating the
hypothesis that aggregate inventory management drives order placement across venues.
Second, our panel regression analysis reveals that local bid-ask spreads vary with the sign
of the order flow in the alternative venue and with the interaction between order flow
and the dispersion in intermediaries’ inventories (measuring divergence in inventories).
These findings are in line with the predictions of the model and cannot be explained by
alternative theories, e.g., adverse selection. Our results complement the existing liter-
ature on liquidity commonality. They suggest that multi-venue inventory management
is an alternative mechanism to the information channel that explains common factors
in liquidity. Effects could be emphasized if we now consider an intermediary trading a
portfolio of assets whose returns are more or less correlated together. The intermedi-
ary’ quotes placement across venues should take into account her aggregate inventories in
the other assets and how they fluctuate together. The impact of multi-venue multi-asset
market-making raises challenging questions related to liquidity spillover across assets and
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across venues. While this is an issue outside the scope of this paper, we believe it is an
interesting topic for future research.
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Figure 1: One day of two-venue quotes placement and aggregate inventory of a Euronext
multi-venue intermediary trading Suez
Figure 1 plots the aggregate inventory of a Euronext intermediary trading Suez and the prices that
she posts in Euronext Paris and Euronext Brussels, compared to the midpoint during that trading day,
January 19, 2007. The intermediary is a formally registered market-maker in Suez. The top graph plots
three series of prices. The pink dash-dotted line plots the midpoint computed as the average between the
consolidated best ask and best bid, i.e., the lowest ask (resp. the highest bid) across the dominant and the
satellite market. The hollow circles depict the prices that the market-maker posts in the satellite market
while the dark-blue triangles depict her quotes in the dominant market. Euronext Paris and Euronext
Brussels are limit order books: the figure only depicts the liquidity supply activity of the market-maker
(limit order placement). The bottom graph plots the aggregate euro inventory of the market-maker for
the day, which is computed using the record of all signed market-makers’ trades multiplied by the price
of transaction across all trading venues.
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Figure 2: Tree of the quoting game across trading venues
Figure 2 represents the tree of the trading game. At date 1 (not represented on the Figure), market-
maker i is endowed with an inventory position denoted Ii. At date 2, venue m is hit by a liquidity shock
with probability ζm, m = D,S. The probability that shocks simultaneously hit both venues is denoted
λ (= ζD × ζS). The probability that shocks have the same sign is denoted γ. The paper analyzes price
formation across venues when the global order flow is net-buying (QD + QS > 0, which occurs with
probability λ/2). Symmetric results are obtained for a net-selling global order flow. At date 3, market-
maker i posts simultaneously a price in venue D and a price in venue S. We denote ami (resp. b
m
i ) the
ask price (resp. bid price) that i posts in venue m if Qm > 0 (resp. Qm < 0).
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Figure 3: Illustration of Proposition 1
Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 1. Panel A shows equilibrium selling prices in a fragmented market when
buy shocks hit simultaneously venues D and S. Panel B depicts equilibrium prices when a buy shock
hits venue D (Panel B (a)) and a sell shock hits venue S (Panel B (b)). The dotted red line depicts
the benchmark selling price of the batch market, the green dashed line plots the best selling price in the
dominant venue, and the plain blue line plots the best ask (Panel A) or best bid (Panel B) price in the
satellite venue. We call p the intersection point of the 3 equilibrium prices in Panel A. The vertical line
QD separates the region in which there is a low divergence in intermediaries’ inventories (I1 − I2 ≤ QD)
from the region in which there is a high divergence in inventories (I1 − I2 > QD). Parameters are
QD = 5, 000, |QS | = 2, 000, Iu = 15, 000, Id = 0, µ = 50, σ2 = 0.001, ρ = 1, I2 = 5, 000, I1 is varying.
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CD + ID
CD
"Parameters: rho1; sigma²0.001; Iu12,000; Id0; phi_d512"
Figure 4: Impact of the inter-dealer market on dealers’ expected profits.
Figure 4 represents intermediaries’ expected profits with or without an initial trading round
in an inter-dealer market, as a function of γ (the probability that shocks have the same
sign) and φS , for φS ≤ φD and φD ≤ Iu − Id. The white squared surface plots the expected
trading profit in the customer-dealer market (CD) only, the grey squared surface plots the
total expected trading profit if intermediaries engage in an inter-dealer round before trading
in the customer-dealer market (CD+ID).
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the data used in this study. The sample consists of 20 multi-
listed, continuously-traded stocks on Euronext exchanges, from January 1, 2007 through April 30, 2007
(79 trading days). The quotes and trades data comes from Euronext, and other stock-level information
comes from Compustat Global.
Panel A reports the daily mean across the 20 stocks for the variables used in this study. Market cap-
italization is price times shares outstanding, in millions of Euros. Number of Trades is the number of
transactions per day across the total number of trading venues. Number of Messages is the daily total
number of orders (submissions, revisions, cancellations) across the total number of trading venues. Trade
Size is the daily average size of transactions across trading venues. Number of Realized Arbitrage Oppor-
tunities is the daily number of times the best bid in the dominant (resp. satellite) market is greater than
the best ask in the satellite (resp. dominant) market and buy and sell trades by the same intermediary
are observed during the window of the arbitrage opportunity. Number of multi-venue intermediaries is
the total number of market-makers as defined in Section 3.1. Average Inventory Divergence (RIm) is
the average divergence in market-makers’ inventories, where inventories are measured each 20 minutes
interval. d POS is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if order flows across venues have the
same direction.
Panel B reports summary statistics by market type. It contains news variables. Bid-Ask Spread is the
equally-weighted average difference between the best bid and the best ask during the day. Relative Spread
is equal to the equally-weighted average of ratio between the spread and the midpoint. Number of Best
Limits Updates is the total number of times there is a change in the best limits. Percentage of Active
Trades is the ratio of the number of transactions caused by a market or a marketable order over the total
number of transactions in the trading venue. Percentage of Passive Trades is the ratio of the number of
limit order hit over the total number of transactions in the trading venue. Percentage of Cancellations
(resp. New Submissions) is the ratio of the number of cancellations (resp. new submissions) over the total
number of messages in the trading venue. Percentage of Revisions is the ratio of the number of revised
orders (messages other than new submissions and cancellations) over the total number of messages in the
trading venue.
Panel C reports summary statistics by multi-venue intermediaries. d DMM is the dummy that take one
if the multi-venue intermediary is an exchange-regulated market-maker, also called Dedicated Market-
Maker (DMM) in the stock. Number of Trades in D is the average daily number of transactions executed
in the dominant venue. Number of Trades in S is the average daily number of transactions executed
in the satellite venue. Percentage of Passive Transactions in S is the ratio of the number of limit order
posted by the intermediary i which are hit in the satellite market over the total number of transactions.
Percentage of Messages in Direction of Inventory is the ratio of the number of messages submitted within
10 seconds in the dominant market after a transaction in the satellite market which are in direction of
inventory management over the total number of messages submitted within 10 seconds in the dominant
market after a transaction in the satellite market. Delay to submit a message in direction of inventory is
the number of second between a transaction in S and an inventory-driven message in D.
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Table 1 
Summary statistics (cont.) 
 
Panel A. Summary statistics by stock 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Market Capitalization (in billion) 1197 30589 33500 2396 20438 50089 
Price 1577 53.30 36.40 25 50 70 
Number of Trades 1577 2645 3142 73 1635 4213 
Number of Messages 1577 9850 9924 1524 7079 15355 
Trade Size 1553 491 576 33 304 1617 
Number of Arbitrage Opportunities 1577 3 9 0 0 3 
Number of multi-venue intermediaries 1577 9 9 3 5 10 
Average inventory divergence, RI_m 1577 .62 .36 .38 .59 .82 
d_POS 1224 .59 .29 .45 .60 .76 
Panel B. Summary statistics by venue 
B.1 Dominant venue 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Bid-Ask Spread 1577 .11 .13 .022 .06 .16 
Relative Bid-Ask Spread 1577 .28 .37 .07 .12 .27 
Number of Best limits Updates 1577 6059 5095 776 4847 9655 
Number of Trades 1577 2577 3108 73 1449 4055 
Percentage of Active Trades 1577 45 26 28 39 54 
Percentage of Passive Trades 1577 55 26 45 60 72 
Percentage of Cancelations 1407 12 13 0 9 21 
Percentage of Revisions 1407 33 36 4 17 60 
Percentage of New Submissions 1407 22 17 5 25 34 
Transaction Size 1577 620 684 192 360 779 
B.2 Satellite venue 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Bid-Ask Spread 1564 1.24 2.38 .066 .33 1.55 
Relative Bid-Ask Spread 1564 1.87 3.28 .24 1,00 1.98 
Number of Best limits Updates 1551 2614 3797 81 794 4040 
Number of Trades 1109 95 385 0 3 20 
Percentage of Active Trades 1109 31 28 0 30 45 
Percentage of Passive Trades 1109 69 28 55 70 100 
Percentage of Cancelations 1395 8 11 0 4 10 
Percentage of Revisions 1395 79 26 70 90 98 
Percentage of New Submissions 1395 8 12 0 4 11 
Transaction Size 1109 348 369 100 250 485 
 
Panel C. Summary statistics by multi-venue intermediary 
 N 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Dummy for Dedicated Market-Maker 178 0,19 0,39 0,00 0,00 1,00 
Average Mean Reversion of Inventory 178 -0,073 0,150 -0,314 -0,013 0,001 
Number of Trades in D 178 70 131 0 8 377 
Number of Trades in S 178 9 28 0 1 69 
Percentage of Messages in Direction of Inventory 110 66 30 0 66 100 
Percentage of Passive Transactions in S 178 53 30 0 52 98 
Delay to submit a message in Direction of Inv.  110 3 2 0 3 8 
Table 2
Likelihood of Expected Inventory-driven Message
following a Transaction in the Satellite Market
This table presents estimates of the relation between the likelihood of an inventory-driven message posted
by the intermediary i in the dominant market after a trade in the satellite market. The left-hand side
variable is Indicator of Expected Message, a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the message has
the expected value. Left-hand side variables are described in caption of Table 1. DMM×Standardized
Inventory is an interaction term equal to the product of DMM and Standardized Inventory. Panel
A shows regression specifications in the subsample of passive transactions. Panel B shows regression
specifications in the subsample of active transactions. All specifications include firm fixed effects and
t-statistics are calculated using standard errors clustered by liquidity supplier. The symbols ***, **, *
denote significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively for the two-tailed hypothesis test that the
coefficient equals zero.
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Table 3
Determinants of Relative Spreads in the Satellite Market
This table presents estimates of the relation between changes in relative bid-ask spreads in the satellite
market and the divergence in intermediaries’ inventories and the direction of order flows across venues.
The left-hand side variable is the Change in Relative Spread of the Satellite market in the 20-minutes
interval. The right-hand-side variables are defined in caption of Table 1. Same Direction×Lag AbsoluteRI
is an interaction term equal to the product of Same Direction and Lag AbsoluteRI. t-statistics are
calculated using standard errors clustered by firm. The symbols ***, **, * denote significance levels of
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively for the two-tailed hypothesis test that the coefficient equals zero.
41
5 Appendix – Proofs
Preliminary element used in the proofs: intermediaries’ trading profits
Market-maker i’s trading profit is given by:
Vi
(
pD1 , p
D
2 , p
S
1 , p
S
2
)
=

pDi QD + p
S
i QS − ri (QD +QS) (QD +QS)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡vi(QD+QS)
if pDi QD < p
D
−iQD and p
S
i QS < p
S
−iQS ,
(
pDi − ri(QD)
)
QD︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡vi(QD)
if pDi QD < p
D
−iQD and p
S
i QS > p
S
−iQS ,
(
pSi − ri (QS)
)
QS︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡vi(QS)
if pDi QD > p
D
−iQD and p
S
i QS < p
S
−iQS ,
0 if pDi QD > p
D
−iQD and p
S
i QS > p
S
−iQS .
where pDi denotes the price set by market-maker i in venue D, and p
S
i denotes the price posted
by i in venue S, i = 1, 2. The price pmi is an ask price if Qm > 0 and a bid price if Qm < 0,
m = D,S.25
Proof of Lemma 1
Case 1. We first look for the necessary conditions that must be simultaneously fulfilled to
guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in which a single market-maker executes the entire
order flow (“ex post consolidation”).
Market-maker i ∈ {1, 2} executes the entire order flow in equilibrium if and only if the ask
price aD prevailing in venue D (in which QD > 0), and the ask price pS (resp. the bid price)
prevailing in venue S are the maximum (resp. minimum in venue S if QS < 0) prices such that:
(i) trading QD + QS is profitable for market-maker i (i.e., vi(QD + QS) ≥ 0), and (i’) not for
market-maker −i (i.e., v−i(QD + QS) < 0); (ii) trading the total order flow is more profitable
for market-maker i than trading only QD (i.e., vi(QD + QS) ≥ vi(QD)) or (ii’) only QS (i.e.,
vi(QD +QS) ≥ vi(QS)); (iii) it is not profitable for market-maker −i to undercut market-maker
i neither in venue D (i.e., v−i(QD) < 0) nor (iii’) in venue S (i.e., v−i(QS) < 0). Using the
definition of market-makers’ reservation prices and trading profits, these conditions rewrite as
25As in Biais (1993), the utility function of intermediaries given in Eq. (1) is linearized, under the
assumption QD < Iu−Id. Note that, in our transparent setting, the criticism on the linear approximation
used by Biais (1993) for opaque markets raised by de Frutos and Manzano (2002) does not apply. The
assumption QD < Iu − Id also guarantees that market-maker i has a probability to post the best price
in venue m which is strictly greater than 0 and strictly lower than 1, for i = 1, 2 and m = D,S.
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follows:
i : aDQD + pSQS ≥ ri(QD +QS)(QD +QS),
i’ : aDQD + pSQS < r−i(QD +QS)(QD +QS);
ii : aD ≥ ri(QD) + ρσ2QS ,
ii’ : pSQS ≥
(
ri(QS) + ρσ
2QD
)
QS ;
iii : aD < r−i(QD),
iii’ : pSQS < r−i(QS)QS .
• Suppose that market-maker 1 trades QD+QS. If (I1−I2−QD)QS ≤ 0, then
(
r1(QS) + ρσ
2QD
)
QS ≥
r2(QS)QS . Thus conditions (ii’) and (iii’) cannot hold simultaneously. A necessary condition
for such an equilibrium to exist is thus (I1− I2−QD)QS > 0, i.e., either I1− I2 > QD if QS > 0
or I1 − I2 < QD if QS < 0.
• Suppose that market-maker 2 trades QD + QS. Recall that by assumption I1 > I2 (implying
that r1(QD + QS) < r2(QD + QS)) and QD + QS > 0. Thus conditions (i) and (i’) cannot
simultaneously hold for market-maker 2. Therefore, there exists no equilibrium such that market-
maker 2 trades the total order flow.
Case 2. We now look for the necessary conditions that must be simultaneously fulfilled to
guarantee the existence of an equilibrium in which the different parts of the order flow are
executed by different market-makers (“ex post fragmentation”).
There exists an equilibrium such that market-maker i ∈ {1, 2} trades QD and market-maker −i
trades QS if and only if the ask price aD prevailing in venue D (in which QD > 0), and the ask
or bid price pS prevailing in venue S (in which QS > 0 or QS < 0) are the maximum (resp.
minimum in market S if QS < 0) prices such that: (I) market-maker i is better off trading QD
rather than QS (i.e., vi(QD) > vi(QS)) and (I’) market-maker −i is better off trading QS rather
than QD (i.e., v−i(QS) > v−i(QD)); (II) market-maker −i is better off trading QS only rather
than QD + QS (i.e., v−i(QD + QS) < v−i(QS)) and (II’) market-maker i is better off trading
QD only rather than QD +QS (i.e., vi(QD +QS) < vi(QD)) ; (III) trading QD is profitable for
market-maker i (i.e., vi(QD) ≥ 0) and (III’) trading QS is profitable for market-maker −i (i.e.,
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vi(QS) ≥ 0). These conditions may be rewritten as follows:
I : aD > ri(QD) + (pS − ri(QS)) QS
QD
,
I ’ : pSQS > r−i(QS)QS + (aD − r−i(QD))QD;
II : aD < r−i(QD) + ρσ2QS ,
II’ : pSQS <
(
ri(QS) + ρσ
2QD
)
QS ;
III : aD ≥ ri(QD),
III’ : pSQS ≥ r−i(QS)QS .
• Suppose that market-maker 1 trades QD and market-maker 2 trades QS. If (I1−I2−QD)QS ≥
0, then conditions II’ and III’ cannot hold simultaneously. A necessary condition for such an
equilibrium to exist is thus (I1 − I2 − QD)QS < 0, that is, either I1 − I2 < QD if QS > 0 or
I1 − I2 > QD if QS < 0.
• Suppose that market-maker 1 trades QS and market-maker 2 trades QD. If QS < 0, then
conditions II and III cannot hold simultaneously, since r1(QD) + ρσ
2QS < r2(QD). If QS > 0,
a necessary condition for conditions I and I’ to hold simultaneously is
r1(QS) + (aD − r1(QD)) QD
QS
< r2(QS) + (aD − r2(QD)) QD
QS
,
which is never true since I1 > I2 and |QD| > |QS |. Consequently, there exists no equilibrium
in which the longer market-maker (here, market-maker 1) would be the first buyer in venue S
while the shorter market-maker (market-maker 2) would be the first seller in venue D.
Finally, the limit case in which (I1 − I2 −QD)QS = 0 is analyzed in the proof of Proposition 1
below. 
Proof of Proposition 1
From Lemma 1, there are various cases to consider, depending on the signs of I1− I2−QD and
QS .
Case 1.1. QS > 0 and I1 − I2 > QD (i.e., (I1 − I2 − QD)QS > 0). From Lemma 1 (Case 1),
we know that market-maker 1 consolidates the entire order flow by posting the best ask price
in both venues D and S. The ask prices aD and aS are the maximum prices that satisfy the set
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of conditions i to iii’:
ii and iii : r1(QD) + ρσ
2QS ≤ aD < r2(QD),
ii’ and iii’ : r1(QS) + ρσ
2QD ≤ aS < r2(QS),
i : r1(QD +QS)(QD +QS) ≤ aDQD + aSQS ,
i’ : aDQD + aSQS < r2(QD +QS)(QD +QS).
From the two first inequalities, (aD)
∗ = r2(QD)−ε and (aS)∗ = r2(QS)−ε are natural candidates
for the equilibrium, as they are the maximum prices that satisfy conditions ii and iii, ii’ and iii’.
Straightforward computations show that they also satisfy conditions i and i’ (details are omitted
for brevity).
Case 1.2. QS < 0 and I1 − I2 < QD (i.e., (I1 − I2 − QD)QS > 0). From Lemma 1 (Case 1),
we know that market-maker 1 consolidates the entire order flow by posting the best ask price
in venue D and the best bid price in venue S. The ask price aD in venue D and the bid price
bS in venue S are respectively the maximum and the minimum prices that satisfy the set of
conditions i to iii’:
ii and iii : r1(QD)− ρσ2(−QS) ≤ aD < r2(QD),
ii’ and iii’ : r2(QS) < bS ≤ r1(QS) + ρσ2QD,
i and i’ : r1(QD +QS)(QD +QS) ≤ aDQD + bSQS < r2(QD +QS)(QD +QS).
The natural candidates for the equilibrium aD = r2(QD)− ε and bS = r2(QS) + ε do not satisfy
condition i’. Consequently, the constraint i’ is binding at equilibrium, and equilibrium prices
must be such that:
(aD)
∗ = r2(QD +QS) + ((bS)∗ − r2(QD +QS))(−QS)
QD
− ε. (8)
First, we input the expression of (aD)
∗ defined in Eq. (8) above in market-maker 1’s trading
profit (conditional on the fact that she executes QD and QS): v1(QD+QS) = ρσ
2(I1−I2)(QD+
QS). This trading profit does not depend on equilibrium prices. Consequently, there exists a
continuum of prices that may sustain the equilibrium. Second, inputting (aD)
∗ defined in Eq.
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(8) into conditions ii to iii’, the equilibrium price in venue S must satisfy:
ii and iii : ρσ2(I2 − I1) QD−QS + r2(QS) ≤ (bS)
∗ < ρσ2(I1 − I2) QD−QS + r2(QS)− ρσ
2QD,
ii’ and iii’ : r2(QS) < (bS)
∗ ≤ r1(QS) + ρσ2QD.
Since I1 > I2, we have ρσ
2(I2− I1) QD−QS < r2(QS) and r1(QS) + ρσ2QD <
(
ρσ2(I2 − I1)
) QD
−QS +
r2(QS)− ρσ2QD. Thus the second inequality is constraining both the minimum and the maxi-
mum possible price in market S. Within all equilibria defined by:
(aD)
∗ = r2(QD +QS)
QD +QS
QD
+ (bS)
∗ (−QS)
QD
− ε,
(bS)
∗ ∈ (r2(QS) + , r1(QS) + ρσ2QD + ],
we select the only equilibrium that is continuous at I1 − I2 = QD, that is, (aD)∗ = r2(QD) −
ρσ2(−QS)− , from which we deduce that (bS)∗ = r2(QS) +  .
Case 2.1. QS > 0 and I1− I2 < QD (i.e., (I1− I2−QD)QS < 0). From Lemma 1 (Case 2), we
know that dealer 1 executes QD while dealer 2 executes QS . The ask prices aD and aS are the
maximum prices that satisfy the set of conditions I to III’:
II and III : r1(QD) ≤ aD < r2(QD) + ρσ2QS ,
II’ and III’ : r2(QS) ≤ aS < r1(QS) + ρσ2QD,
I : aD > r1(QD) + (aS − r1(QS)) QS
QD
,
I’ : aS > r2(QS) + (aD − r2(QD)) QD
QS
.
The candidates for the equilibrium aD = r2(QD)+ρσ
2QS−ε and aS = r1(QS)+ρσ2QD−ε from
the two first inequalities do not satisfy condition I’. Consequently, the constraint I’ is binding
at equilibrium, and equilibrium prices must be such that:
(aD)
∗ = r2(QD) + ((aS)∗ − r2(QS))QS
QD
− ε. (9)
First, notice that under the condition in Eq. (9), condition I always holds (given that (I1 −
I2)(QD −QS) > 0). Second, inputting (aD)∗ defined in Eq. (9) into conditions (II and III) and
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(II’ and III’) yields the following restrictions on (aS)
∗:
II and III : r2(QS) + (r1(QD)− r2(QD)) QD
QS
≤ (aS)∗ < r2(QS) + ρσ2QD,
II’ and III’ : r2(QS) ≤ (aS)∗ < r1(QS) + ρσ2QD.
Third, we compute market-makers’ equilibrium profits. The trading profit of market-maker
2 (conditional on the fact that he executes QS) writes: v2(QS) = ((aS)
∗ − r2(QS))QS . We
use the expression of (aD)
∗ defined in Eq. (9) to compute the trading profit of market-
maker 1 (conditional on the fact that she executes QD) as a function of (aS)
∗: v1(QD) =(
r2(QD) + ((aS)
∗ − r2(QS))QSQD − r1(QD)
)
QD.
We observe that market-makers’ profits are both strictly increasing in (aS)
∗. Consequently,
market-makers’ reaction functions are such that the best ask price in venue S is the highest
possible one. From conditions (II and III) and (II’ and III’), and under the hypothesis that
I1 − I2 < QD, we deduce that condition (II’ and III’) is binding and that (aS)∗ is such that:
(aS)
∗ = r1(QS) + ρσ2QD − ε, (10)
from which we deduce that:
(aD)
∗ = r2(QD) + ρσ2QS − ρσ2(I1 − I2)QS
QD
− ε. (11)
Consequently, there exists a unique equilibrium such that market-maker 1 posts (aD)
∗ (defined
in Eq. (11)) and trades QD while market-maker 2 posts the best ask price equal to (aS)
∗ (defined
in Eq. (10)) and trades QS .
Case 2.2. QS < 0 and I1 − I2 > QD (i.e., (I1 − I2 − QD)QS < 0). From Lemma 1 (Case 2),
we know that market-maker 1 executes QD while market-maker 2 executes QS . The ask price
aD in venue D and the bid price bS in venue S are respectively the maximum and the minimum
prices that satisfy the set of conditions I to III’:
II and III : r1(QD) ≤ aD < r2(QD) + ρσ2QS ,
II’ and III’ : r1(QS) + ρσ
2QD < bS ≤ r2(QS),
I : aD > r1(QD) + (bS − r1(QS)) QS
QD
,
I ’ : bS < r2(QS) + (r2(QD)− aD) QD−QS .
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From the two first inequalities, aD = r2(QD) − ρσ2(−QS) − ε and bS = r1(QS) + ρσ2QD + ε
are natural candidates for the equilibrium. Straightforward computations show that they also
satisfy conditions I and I’.
Case 3: I1−I2 = QD, i.e., (I1−I2−QD)QS = 0. Notice that if I1−I2 = QD, then the equilibrium
described in 1.1. cannot be sustained because conditions ii’ and iii’ (i.e., r1(QS)+ρσ
2QD ≤ aS =
r2(QS)) cannot hold simultaneously due to the strict inequality, which contradicts the equality
r1(QS) + ρσ
2QD = r2(QS). If (aD)
∗ = r2(QD) − ε and (aS)∗ = r2(QS) = r1(QS) + ρσ2QD
however, conditions i, i’, ii, ii’ and iii hold. Thus at these prices, market-maker 2 becomes
indifferent between trading QS or not, and market-maker 1 is indifferent between executing
QD +QS or QD. 
Proof of Corollary 1
In our set up (identical risk aversion and identical pre-trade inventory distribution), we can
measure intermediaries’ aggregate posttrade risk by the sum of the variance of their posttrade
wealths (Yin, 2005). In the batch auction, the longer intermediary executes the entire order
flow, thus the aggregate posttrade risk, denoted by (σ2agg)
batch, is equal to:
(σ2agg)
batch = V ar((I1 −QD −QS)v˜) + V ar((I2)v˜). (12)
In a fragmented market, posttrade allocations depend on the sign of (I1 − I2 −QD )QS .
• If (I1 − I2 −QD)QS > 0, the aggregate posttrade risk is similar to that in the batch auction,
because the longer intermediary consolidates the entire order flow:
(σ2agg)
cons = V ar((I1 −QD −QS)v˜) + V ar((I2)v˜) = (σ2agg)batch.
• If (I1 − I2 −QD)QS ≤ 0, shocks are absorbed by different intermediaries (ex post fragmenta-
tion) and the aggregate posttrade risk is equal to:
(σ2agg)
frag = V ar((I1 −QD)v˜) + V ar((I2 −QS)v˜). (13)
Then, subtracting Eq. (13) from Eq. (12) is equal to (σ2agg)
frag − (σ2agg)batch = 2QS(I1 − I2 −
QD) < 0, which is negative in the case considered here.
Proof of Proposition 2
We decompose the proof into two results, depending on the sign of QS .
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Notations. For ease of computation in the proof, we use the following notations qm = Qm for a
net-buying order flow and qm = −Qm for a net-selling order flow (m = S,D). Let us also define
vd = µ− ρσ2Id, vu = µ− ρσ2Iu, x = µ− ρσ2I1 and y = µ− ρσ2I2. The support of the uniform
distribution function of x and y simplifies to [vu, vd]. We also note d = ρσ
2qD and s = ρσ
2qS .
Finally, let am,+ (resp. am,−) be the best ask price of venue m when liquidity demands have the
same sign (resp. opposite sign) across venues.
Result 1 Suppose that shocks have the same sign (with probability γ). Then, the expected ask
prices quoted in the venues D and S are equal to:
E
(
am,+
)
= µ− ρσ2 2Id + Iu
3
+
ρσ2qm
2
+ ρσ2q−m
(
qD
Iu − Id −
1
3
(
qD
Iu − Id
)2)
,m = S,D. (14)
Proof. We first compute the expected ask that prevails in venue D. By definition,
E
(
aD,+
)
= E
(
min
(
aD1 , a
D
2
)
1QD>01QS>0
)
.
Given Proposition 1, the notations defined above, and the symmetry of our hypotheses, the
latter equation writes:
E
(
aD,+
)
=
2
(vd − vu)2
[∫ vd−d
vu
∫ vd
x+d
(y +
d
2
)dydx+
∫ vd
vu
∫ vd
x
(
y +
d
2
+ s
(
d− (y − x)
d
))
dydx
−
∫ vd−d
vu
∫ vd
x+d
(
y +
d
2
+ s
(
d− (y − x)
d
))
dydx
]
. (15)
We now turn to the expected ask prevailing in venue S using a similar reasoning. The expression
writes:
E
(
aS,+
)
= E
(
min
(
aS1 , a
S
2
)
1QD>01QS>0
)
=
2
(vd − vu)2
[∫ vd−d
vu
∫ vd
x+d
(y +
s
2
)dydx+
∫ vd
vu
∫ vd
x
(
x+
s
2
+ d
)
dydx
−
∫ vd−d
vu
∫ vd
x+d
(
x+
s
2
+ d
)
dydx
]
. (16)
Computations based on Eq. (15) and on Eq. (16) yield the expressions given in Eq. (14) for
m = D and m = S respectively. Q.E.D.
Result 2 Suppose that shocks have opposite signs (with probability 1−γ), then the expected ask
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prices in venues D and S respectively write:
E
(
aD,−
)
= µ− ρσ2 2Id + Iu
3
+
ρσ2qD
2
− ρσ2qS , (17)
E
(
aS,−
)
= µ− ρσ2 2Id + Iu
3
+
ρσ2qS
2
− ρσ2qD + (qD)
2
(Iu − Id) −
(qD)
3
3 (Iu − Id)2
. (18)
Proof. We first compute the expected best ask prevailing in venue D (considering a sell shock
in venue S):
E
(
aD,−
)
= E
(
min
(
aD1 , a
D
2
)
1QD>01QS<0
)
,
which rewrites:
E
(
aD,−
)
=
2
(vd − vu)2
(
∫ vd−d
vu
∫ x+d
vu
(y +
d
2
− s)dydx
+
∫ vd
vu
∫ vd
x
(y +
d
2
− s)dydx−
∫ vd−d
vu
∫ vd
x+d
(y +
d
2
− s)dydx). (19)
Eq. (17) immediately follows.
Symmetrically, the expected best ask prevailing in market S (considering now a sell shock in
venue D) writes:
E(aS,−) =
2
(vd − vu)2
(∫ vd
vu−d
∫ x+d
vu
(x+
s
2
+ d)dydx+
∫ vd
vu
∫ x
vu
(y +
s
2
)dydx
−
∫ vd
vu−d
∫ x+d
vu
(y +
s
2
)dydx
)
. (20)
Computations yield Eq. (18). Q.E.D.
Let us define the half-spread as sm = am − µ and φm = qmIu−Id . Proposition 2 is then obtained
from Results 1 and 2 considering the extensive form of the game represented in Figure 2. 
Proof of Proposition 3
By definition, Cov(sD, sS) = γCov(aD,+ − µ, aS,+ − µ) + (1 − γ)Cov(aD,− − µ, µ − bS,−) =
γCov(aD,+, aS,+) − (1 − γ)Cov(aD,−, bS,−). We thus decompose the proof into two results,
depending on the sign of shocks across venues (similar or opposite).
Result 3 Suppose that shocks have the same sign (with probability γ). The covariance between
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the ask price in venue D and the one in venue S is equal to:
Cov(aD,+, aS,+)
(ρσ2)2(Iu − Id)2 =
1
18
−φD
(
−φD − φS
6
+
2(φS − φD)
9
φD +
15φS − φD
12
φ2D +
2φS
3
φ3D +
φS
9
φ4D
)
,
(21)
where φm =
qm
(Iu−Id) , m = D,S.
Proof. By definition, E
(
aD,+aS,+
)
= E
(
min
(
aD1 , a
D
2
)×min (aS1 , aS2 )1QD>01QS>0). Using
Proposition 1, and notations defined above, we get:
E
(
aD,+aS,+
)
=
2
(vd − vu)2
[∫ vd−d
vu
∫ vd−d
vu
(y +
s
2
)(y +
d
2
)dydx
+
∫ vd
vu
∫ vd
x
(x+
s
2
+ d)(y +
d
2
+ s
(
d− (y − x)
d
)
)dydx
−
∫ vd−d
vu
∫ vd
x+d
(x+
s
2
+ d)(y +
d
2
+ s
(
d− (y − x)
d
)
)
]
. (22)
To compute Cov(aD,+, aS,+) = E(aD,+aS,+) − E(aD,+)E(aS,+), we use the expression above
and Result 1 for expressions of E
(
aD,+
)
and E
(
aS,+
)
. Computations yield Eq. (21). Q.E.D.
Result 4 Suppose that shocks have opposite signs (1−γ). The covariance between the best price
in venue D and the one in venue S writes:
Cov
(
aD,−, bS,−
)
(ρσ2)2(Iu − Id)2 =
1
36
+
(φD)
2
36
(
3 (φD)
2 − 8φD + 6
)
. (23)
Proof. If a sell shock hits venue S, the expected best bid in venue S is such that E(b
S,−
) =
E(max(bS1 , b
S
2 )1QD>01QS<0), or:
E(b
S,−
) =
2
(vd − vu)2
(
∫ vd−d
vu
∫ vd
x+d
(x+
s
2
+ d)dydx+
∫ vd
vu
∫ vd
x
(y +
s
2
)dydx
−
∫ vd−d
vu
∫ vd
x+d
(y +
s
2
)dydx) (24)
When a buy shock hits venue D, the expected best ask price of venue D is thus described by
Eq. (17). Then E(aD,−bS,−) writes:
E(aD,−bS,−) =
2
(vd − vu)2
[
∫ vd−d
vu
∫ vd
x+d
(y +
d
2
− s)(x+ s
2
+ d)dydx
+
∫ vd
vu
∫ vd
x
(y +
d
2
− s)(y + s
2
)dydx−
∫ vd−d
vu
∫ vd
x+d
(y +
d
2
− s)(y + s
2
)dydx]. (25)
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Using Equations (17), (24) and (25), we can deduce the expression of Cov(aD,−, bS,−) described
in Eq. (23). Q.E.D.
Proposition 3 is obtained from Results 3 and 4 considering the extensive form of the game
represented in Figure 2. 
Proof of Corollary 2
Remind that abatch denotes the lowest ask price in the benchmark model in which the global
order flow is batched and executed by the intermediary with the larger inventory. From Ho and
Stoll (1983), we know that:
E
(
abatch
)
= µ− ρσ2 2Id + Iu
3
+
ρσ2(qm + q−m)
2
. (26)
Using Eq. (14), (17) and (24) and the symmetry of the game, we deduce that the difference in
transactions costs between a fragmented and a batch market is:
∆TC = γ
(
E
(
aD,+
)
qD + E
(
aS,+
)
qS − E
(
abatch
)
(qD + qS)
)
+ (1− γ)
(
E
(
aD,−
)
qD − E
(
b
S,−)
qS − E
(
abatch
)
(qD − qS)
)
.
After straightforward computations the latter expression is equal to:
∆TC = ρσ2qS (Iu − Id)
(
−(γ + 1)
3
)
Pγ(φD), (27)
where Pγ(x) = x
3 − 3x2 + 3(γ+1)x+ (γ−1)(γ+1) for x ∈ [0, 1], and φD = qDIu−Id .
To investigate whether transaction costs are larger or smaller in the batch auction, let us analyze
the sign of the cubic polynomial Pγ . First, note that:
P ′γ (x) = 3x
2 − 6x+ 3
(1 + γ)
= 3
(
x−
(
1−
√
γ
1 + γ
))(
x−
(
1 +
√
γ
1 + γ
))
.
Given that x ∈ [0, 1], then x−
(
1 +
√
γ
1+γ
)
< 0, and the sign of P ′γ (x) only depends on the sign of(
x−
(
1−
√
γ
1+γ
))
. Pγ is increasing if x <
(
1−
√
γ
1+γ
)
and is decreasing if x >
(
1−
√
γ
1+γ
)
.
Thus, the local maximum is Pγ(1−
√
γ
1+γ ) =
γ
(
−1+2
√
γ
1+γ
)
1+γ .
• Consider the case where γ ≤ 13 . Straightforward computations show that Pγ(1 −
√
γ
1+γ ) ≤ 0
(with Pγ(1−
√
γ
1+γ ) = 0 if γ =
1
3). We therefore deduce that Pγ ≤ 0, i.e., ∆TC > 0 if γ ≤ 13 .
• Consider now the case where γ > 13 . We can show that Pγ > 0, or, equivalently, ∆TC < 0
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iff x ∈ [Φ1γ ,Φ2γ ] where Pγ(Φ1γ) = 0 = Pγ(Φ2γ). Note that if γ = 1, then it is direct to show that
P1 > 0 if x ∈ [0, (3−
√
3)
2 ], or equivalently, ∆TC < 0 iff φD <
(3−√3)
2 .
Proof of Proposition 4
Given the equilibrium prices
(
(aD)∗, (aS)∗
)
derived in Proposition 1, transaction costs write:
TC(α) = [((aD)∗(αQ)− δD − µ)α+ ((aS)∗((1− α)Q)− δS − µ)(1− α)]×Q. (28)
We want to show that there exists an interior equilibrium, that is, an α∗ ∈ [12 , 1) that minimizes
transaction costs TC(.).
• We first conjecture that there exists an equilibrium characterized by a high divergence in
intermediaries’ inventories, i.e., 12 ≤ α < I1−I2Q . The first order condition (FOC) yields:
αH =
1
2
+
δD − δS
2ρσ2Q
.
The two conditions for an interior equilibrium α ∈ [12 , 1) to exist are thus: i. a condition ensuring
that our conjecture holds, i.e., αH < I1−I2Q , and ii. a condition ensuring that the equilibrium is
interior, i.e., αH < 1. The latter always holds under our assumption δD−δS < ρσ2Q. Condition
i. rewrites as follows:
I1 − I2 > 1
2
(
Q+
δD − δS
ρσ2
)
. (29)
• We now conjecture that there exists an equilibrium characterized by a low divergence in
intermediaries’ inventories, i.e., α ≥ I1−I2Q . The FOC yields:
αL =
1
2
− δD − δS
2ρσ2Q
+
(I1 − I2)
Q
.
The three conditions for an interior equilibrium to exist are such that: (i) our conjecture must
hold, i.e., αL ≥ I1−I2Q ; (ii) there exists an interior equilibrium, i.e., αL < 1; and (iii) αL ≥ 12 .
Condition (i) always holds under our assumption δD − δS < ρσ2Q. Condition (ii) translates
into I1 − I2 < Q2 + δD−δS2ρσ2 , which is the complement of the condition (29) above. Notice that if
I1− I2 = Q2 + δD−δS2ρσ2 , then there exists an equilibrium such that α∗ = 1. Condition (iii) imposes
I1 − I2 ≥ δD−δS2ρσ2 (or r2(Q)− r1(Q) > δD − δS).26
Proof of Corollary 3
First stage: the inter-dealer market (ID). If market-maker 1 sells a quantity q at price p
26If I1 − I2 < δD−δS2ρσ2 , there is no solution to the FOC in[ 12 , 1). There is a corner equilibrium: α∗ = 1.
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to market-maker 2 in the inter-dealer market, the profits of market-maker 1 and 2 respectively
write: (
vID1 =
[
p− µ− ρσ
2
2
(q − 2I1)
]
q; vID2 =
[
µ− ρσ
2
2
(q + 2I2)− p
]
q
)
.
We maximize market-makers’ profits with respect to q to find market-maker 1’s supply function,
and market-maker 2’s demand function. The crossing of the supply and demand curves yields
the following symmetric equilibrium in the inter-dealer market:(
q∗ID =
I1 − I2
2
; p∗ID = µ− ρσ2
I1 + I2
2
)
.
At equilibrium in the inter-dealer market, market-makers’ profits write
(
vID1
)∗
=
(
vID2
)∗
=
ρσ2
8 (I1 − I2)2. Notice that market-makers find it optimal to perfectly share risk: after trading
in the inter-dealer market, market-makers 1 and 2 end up with the same inventory position,
I ′1 = I ′2.
Second stage: the customer-dealer market (CD). Given market-makers’ inventory posi-
tions after their trades in the inter-dealer market, their equilibrium profits in the customer-dealer
market can be computed at the limit when I ′1 → I ′2 using the formula derived in the proof of
Proposition 1. We find:
(
v
CD|ID
1
)∗
=
(
v
CD|ID
2
)∗
= ρσ2qDqS .
Comparison. We finally compute market-makers’ expected profits in the presence of an
inter-dealer market, namely V CD+ID = E
((
v
CD|ID
i
)∗
+
(
vIDi
)∗)
, and compare them with
the expected profits they obtain in the absence of an inter-dealer market, namely
(
V CD
)∗
=
E
((
vCDi
)∗)
. Computations yield:
V CD+ID =
ρσ2
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(Iu − Id)2 + γρσ2qDqS , (30)
and
V CD =
ρσ2
6
(Iu − Id) (qD + (2γ − 1)qS)
+
ρσ2qS
(Iu − Id)2 ×
 (1− γ)(Iu − Id)3 − (3(1− γ)qD + 12γqS) (Iu − Id)2
+
{
(1− γ)qD + 12γqS
}
qD (3(Iu − Id)− qD)
 . (31)
To assess the impact of the existence of an inter-dealer market on intermediaries’ expected
profits, one needs to compare the expressions given in Eq. (30) and (31). Closed-form solutions
are difficult to interpret. However there exist parameters’ values such that intermediaries would
prefer not to share risk in an inter-dealer market, that is, V CD > V CD+ID. Figure 4 shows
54
that intermediaries are better off trading ex ante in an inter-dealer market only when (i) the
probability that shocks have the same sign, γ, is high, and (ii) the size of the liquidity demand
sent to the satellite venue, qS , is small. 
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